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1.  Introduction
According to media reports, there appears to be broad public support for capital 
punishment in Japan.1)  Since 1956, the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce has conducted a 
public opinion poll on capital punishment irregularly; and every ﬁve years since 
1994, surveying 3,000 men and women aged 20 or older nationwide.  The result in 
2009 revealed that public support reached 85.6 percent, the highest percentage ever 
compared to 81.4 percent in 2004; 79.3 percent in 1999; and 73.8 percent in 1994.2) 
Whilst these results appear to demonstrate strong public support for capital punish-
ment, an examination of the questions posed leaves room for doubt.  In seeking pub-
lic opinion regarding capital punishment, the poll required participants to choose 
between three choices: 1) “it is unavoidable in certain circumstances,” 2) “it should be 
abolished in all circumstances,” and 3) “I do not know.”  The results in 2009 were 85.6 
percent, 5.7 percent and 8.6 percent, respectively.  As Sato¯ Mai critically explains, 
the ﬁrst two answers appear to have been framed strategically in order to produce 
results that would justify government policy.3)  Whilst it may seem that the retention 
of capital punishment is in accordance with popular opinion, a second look at the is-
sue may yield alternate views.  Why does Japan, an advanced industrial democracy, 
retain the death penalty?  This paper seeks to investigate institutional constraints to 
global opposition to capital punishment by unpacking the real key actors who are 
responsible for making decisions.  It is often considered that “Japan” has collectively 
chosen to retain capital punishment despite the urgings of opponents to comply with 
international norms against the death penalty.  However, campaigns against capital 
punishment cannot be effective without understanding the complex dynamics of 
how responsibility is distributed within governmental agencies.  This paper will 
identify key players in three relevant governmental agencies: the Ministry of Justice, 
the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce, and detention centers as the afﬁliated facilities of the 
Ministry of Justice.  It will seek to clarify the role played by each actor by consider-
ing the following six questions: (1) which division of what governmental agency is in 
charge of capital punishment; (2) who generates confessions from offenders in order 
that result in sentences of capital punishment; (3) who runs the day-to-day service of 
death row inmates; (4) who prepares ofﬁcial documents to execute death row in-
mates legally; (5) who authorizes the execution; and (6) who executes the death row 
inmates?  The paper challenges the perception that the Japanese government retains 
capital punishment out of respect to public sentiment; instead, it contends that the 
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system has been supported and run by bureaucrats in several governmental agen-
cies, irrespective of public opinion and even in disregard to the thinking of party 
politicians.
2.  Three Japanese Governmental Agencies and the Issue of Capital Punishment
At ﬁrst sight, the Prime Minister seems to represent Japanese policy and exert a 
fair amount of power on the issue of capital punishment.  The Prime Minister ap-
points the Minister of Justice (ho¯mu daijin) who is in charge of authorizing execu-
tions; moreover, it is the Prime Minister’s Ofﬁce that periodically conducts opinion 
polls on human rights and capital punishment system.  However, in reality, the 
Prime Minister often rubber stamps candidates for the position of Minister of Justice 
proposed by bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice; in other words, who is chosen to 
serve as the Minister of Justice does not necessarily reﬂect the thinking of the Prime 
Minister.  In addition, the Prime Minister does not get personally involved in fram-
ing questions for opinion polls; this too is a function performed by bureaucrats in 
charge of the issue.  Similarly, whilst the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) appears 
to represent Japan’s policy in bilateral and multilateral settings, it does not make de-
cisions relating to capital punishment independently.  Although MOFA is responsi-
ble for the day-to-day running of Japanese foreign relations and functions as Japan’s 
window on the world, it simply reproduces decisions formulated by ministry bureau-
crats who collectively are in charge of Japanese government policy.4)  Power is thus 
distributed amongst key actors in the Japanese government, and decision-making 
with regard to capital punishment, likewise, involves the action of particular actors 
in particular agencies.
2.1.  The Ministry of Justice
Capital punishment in Japan has not been treated as a human rights issue.  In-
stead, it is handled within the Criminal Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Justice. 
There are two government agencies concerned with human rights protection in Ja-
pan: the Human Rights Bureau in the Ministry of Justice and the Human Rights 
and Humanitarian Affairs Division in MOFA.  I approached both of these bodies to 
see if they would agree to an interview.  In January 2011, the Human Rights Bureau 
denied my request, stating that they are not in charge of capital punishment.  I was urged 
to contact the Criminal Affairs Bureau.  In the meantime, two senior ministers in 
the MOFA division agreed to be interviewed in June 2011.  However, they also de-
nied any responsibility for dealing with the issue of capital punishment, now or in 
the future.  Both groups maintained that capital punishment is not a human rights 
concern but an issue of legal punishment under the aegis of the Criminal Affairs Bu-
reau in the Ministry of Justice.
Article 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that capital punishment 
shall be executed under an order from the Minister of Justice within six months of 
the ﬁnal verdict.  Article 476 also provides that execution shall be carried out within 
ﬁve days upon authorization.  However, as with Prime Ministers, Ministers of Justice 
are not independent decision-makers.  The following discussion attempts to locate 
where decision making actually takes place.  I will ﬁrst divide past Ministers of Jus-
95
tice into three types according to their attitude toward capital punishment.  Second-
ly, I will brieﬂy summarize the domestic debate on the legality and propriety that 
some Ministers of Justice do not authorize execution based on their personal beliefs. 
I conclude, however, that an examination of the thought and behavior of Ministers 
of Justice does not tell us much about the actual decision-making system regarding 
capital punishment in Japan.
Ministers of Justice: Different Views on Capital Punishment
There are roughly three types of Ministers of Justice; according to Petra Schmidt, 
there are the doves, the hawks, and the in-betweens.5)  In other words, (1) those who 
are opposed to the death penalty and do not authorize executions based on their 
personal convictions or religious beliefs; (2) those who are in favor of the death pen-
alty and authorize the executions; and (3) those who are opposed to the death penal-
ty but authorize the execution of one or two inmates annually in order not to realize 
a de facto moratorium period.  No execution, for example, was carried out between 
1989 and 1993; and between 2005 and 2006, the direct reason being that the Minis-
ters of Justice during these terms did not authorize executions.  To be more precise, 
not all of the Ministers of Justice during these de facto moratorium from 1989 to 1993 
can be characterized as doves; Sato¯ Megumu, who served between December 1990 
and November 1991, disclosed after his resignation that he did not authorize execu-
tions because of his personal religious beliefs.  Other Ministers of Justice did not have 
a chance to authorize an execution since they all resigned within a short period.
Examples of those categorized as hawks include Goto¯da Masaharu, Mikazuki 
Akira, and Hatoyama Yukio.  Given that Article 475 of the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure speciﬁes that Ministers of Justice have the responsibility to authorize execu-
tions, bureaucrats in the Ministry of Justice complain that non-authorization by 
Ministers of Justice can create “unfairness” amongst death row inmates and their 
families, and amongst the bereaved families of the victims, especially when one pro-
death penalty Minister takes over from one who is opposed to the death penalty.6) 
Goto¯da Masaharu, who resumed the authorization of executions in March 1993 for 
the ﬁrst time in three years and four months, showed a consistent pro-death penalty 
attitude during his term of service (December 1992 to August 1993).  Goto¯da insist-
ed that once a judge sentences a convicted criminal to capital punishment, the Min-
ister of Justice should authorize the execution as speciﬁed in the law.7)  He also 
stressed that Ministers of Justice should accept this responsibility in order to main-
tain legal order in Japan; those unhappy with this responsibility should resign im-
mediately.8)  This approach was followed by his successor, Mikazuki Akira (August 
1993 to April 1994), who authorized executions for four death row inmates believing 
in the deterrent effect of capital punishment.  Later, Hatoyama Kunio (August 2007 
to September 2008) ordered an execution the 13 detainees in less than a year.  This 
was the largest number of executions since Goto¯da resumed them in March 1993. 
Following this, the Asahi Shinbun, a major Japanese newspaper, condemned his be-
havior by calling him Shinigami, or the Grim Reaper.9)  As the number of executions 
began to invite foreign criticism, especially from human rights groups such as Am-
nesty International, Hatoyama stressed that capital punishment is a strictly domestic 
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issue.  He defended it not only on utilitarian grounds, saying that it was necessary to 
achieve social justice, but on cultural grounds as well, declaring that capital punish-
ment is an indigenous system deeply rooted in Japan’s own history and culture.  As such, 
third parties should have no say.10)
Finally, Chiba Keiko is an example of an “in-between” Minister of Justice.  Chiba 
has a long history as an outspoken anti-death penalty advocate and member of the 
Parliamentary League for the Abolition of the Death Penalty.  She was appointed as 
the Minister of Justice in 2009 under the administration of Hatoyama Yukio (the 
brother of Hayoyama Kunio) and was reappointed in 2010 under Kan Naoto.  Al-
though she resigned from the Parliamentary League when she was given the ap-
pointment, for nearly one year she managed to avoid giving her authorization for 
the execution of convicted criminals.  Members of several NGOs opposing the 
death penalty looked forward to celebrating one year free of executions.11)  However, 
on 28 July 2010, two death row inmates were executed without prior notice, much to 
the chagrin of anti-death penalty activists.  Newspaper and television coverage shed 
light on positive aspects of the event.  Chiba became the very ﬁrst Minister of Justice 
to actually witness a hanging, and in press conferences stressed the need for a funda-
mental debate on capital punishment:
It is not that I changed my mind […] I attended the executions as I believe it is 
my duty to see them through.  […] Witnessing [them] with my own eyes made 
me think deeply about the death penalty, and I once again strongly felt that 
there is a need for a fundamental discussion.12)
She showed her enthusiasm to set up a study group on the issue within the Minis-
try of Justice and to allow the media access to the execution sites in order to spur do-
mestic debate.13)  Following this event, the execution venue began to allow media ac-
cess.  Based on testimony from prosecutors who witnessed the hangings, details of 
how death row inmates are brought to the venue and exactly how they are executed 
were disclosed ofﬁcially on television for the ﬁrst time, though most of these details 
had been available in extant literature compiled by NGOs.  Nonetheless, anti-death 
penalty NGOs were disappointed with her political decision.  They saw this event as 
nothing but a performance by the Ministry of Justice to show that a de facto moratori-
um will not be realized even under a Minister who opposes the death penalty.14) 
They complained that Chiba’s achievements (setting up a study group, allowing me-
dia access to the execution chamber, and disclosing execution details) could have 
been achieved without authorizing even one execution.  This event highlighted the 
sad fact that Ministers are unable to make independent decision.
Rights and Responsibility of the Ministers of Justice
Article 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been interpreted in various 
ways by different scholars.  Mizutani Norio, professor of law at Osaka University, ar-
gues that the provisions of Article 475 do not automatically bind Ministers of Justice 
to carry out executions.  He notes, for example, that Article 32 of the Act on Penal 
Detention Facilities and Treatment of Inmates and Detainees stipulates that:
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(1) Upon treatment of an inmate sentenced to death, attention shall be paid to 
help him/her maintain peace of mind.  (2) Measures such as counseling or lec-
tures which may contribute to helping the inmate sentenced to death to main-
tain peace of mind shall be taken by obtaining cooperation from nongovern-
mental volunteers.15)
Mizutani, therefore, argues that Ministers of Justice do not have to authorize exe-
cutions until the death row inmate’s peace of mind is secured.16)  Secondly, he con-
tends that it is reasonable that Ministers of Justice do not authorize executions whilst 
debates on capital punishment are taking place both inside and outside of the coun-
try.  Internationally, there is a broad and growing consensus against the death penal-
ty; domestically, Japan re-introduced a lay judge system (saiban-in seido) on 21 May 
2009.  Under this system, citizens chosen randomly from the electoral register deter-
mine both guilt (or innocence) and the sentence to be imposed.  This new system 
has raised public consciousness on capital punishment.17)  Similarly, in interviews 
with a professor of law and a researcher on the Japanese constitution conducted in 
Tokyo in May 2011, both scholars defended the legality of decisions by Ministers of 
Justice not to comply with Article 475.  According to Article 99 of the Constitution 
of Japan, “The Emperor or the Regent as well as Ministers of State, members of the 
Diet, judges, and all other public ofﬁcials have the obligation to respect and uphold 
this Constitution.”  Moreover, Article 13 provides that “All of the people shall be re-
spected as individuals.  Their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness shall, 
to the extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare, be the supreme con-
sideration in legislation and in other governmental affairs”.18)  Therefore, according 
to the constitutional scholars, it is not necessarily illegal for Ministers of Justice to re-
frain from authorizing executions, even though it may seem to be against the Code 
of Criminal Procedure: it is rather manitory for Ministers of Justice to be extraordi-
narily careful with decisions that relate to matters of life or death, as stipulated in 
Article 13 of the Constitution.  It is also their responsibility to encourage debate in 
the Diet or in the public in order to amend the law if necessary.19)
Thus, examining solely what role Ministers of Justice play may not be helpful in 
an analysis of how important decisions are made regarding the issue of capital pun-
ishment.  Whilst Ministers of Justice rarely stay in ofﬁce for more than one year on 
average, employed-for-life bureaucrats (most of them former prosecutors with a sub-
stantial personal network within the ministry) are the true key players.20)  As David 
T. Johnson, Professor of Sociology at the University of Hawaii, argues: “It is the 
prosecutor more than any other actor who controls the course of capital punishment 
in Japan, for it is the prosecutor who controls both the inputs into the system–which 
cases to charge capital–and the outputs–which cases to present to the Minister of 
Justice for the signing that authorizes hanging.”21)  The next section seeks to clarify 
the role of prosecutors in this issue from two perspectives: how prosecutors generate 
confessions from offenders that may lead to a sentence of capital punishment; and 
how they prepare the legal documents that order the execution of death row in-
mates.
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2.2.  Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce
Interrogations to Generate Confessions
The exceptional efﬁciency of the Japanese criminal justice system and its high 
conviction rates have been studied by various scholars.22)  It is generally agreed that 
confessions lie at the heart of Japanese criminal justice.  This is because “prosecutors 
(and police detectives) are evaluated in terms of their investigative efﬁciency, which 
is measured chieﬂy by their success or failure in securing confessions”, and they do 
their best to make offenders confess using all available measures.23)  As a result:
Investigators are highly intrusive and sometime coercive.  Truth is fabricated, 
corrupted, and concealed.  Mistakes are made.  Bias exists.  […] Most funda-
mentally, the system is so hostile to outside scrutiny that it remains impossible 
to see or say what many of the problems are.24)
Johnson has compiled an empirical study detailed how Japan’s two thousand pros-
ecutors exercise their formidable powers.25)  His work is helpful in understanding 
how prosecutors and police detectives have sometimes contributed to the execution 
of innocent people.  Johnson calls Japan a “paradise for prosecutors” and explains 
how prosecutors exert inﬂuential power in generating confession.26)  He notes:
In Japan confessions are the king of evidence, and prosecutors are given wide 
legal latitude to compose them in their own words and to use them as evidence 
at trial […] [T]he law gives investigators many tools to extract confessions: time, 
the single most effective instrument in their arsenal; a convenient place (police 
detention cells); control over meetings between suspects and defense counsel; 
and so on.”27)
Police detention cells (daiyo¯  kangoku) are the site where prosecutors are able to ob-
tain confessions from suspects at a rate of over 90 percent.28)  Suspects are detained 
in daiyo¯  kangoku for up to 23 days for interrogation.  According to Amnesty Interna-
tional, “there are no rules or regulations regarding the length of interrogations car-
ried out during this period.”29)  In 1980s, four major retrials revealed that false 
charges that resulted from forced confession by prosecutors: the Menda Case, the 
Saitagawa Case, the Shimada Case, and the Matsuyama Case.30)  There are other 
unsolved cases, some going back decades.  Okunishi Masaru, 86, for example, has 
been on death row since 1961 for poisoning ﬁve women.  He may well have been the 
victim of forced confession resulting from long interrogation sessions.  As of 2012, 
detained for 51 years, he is the longest-serving inmate in a Japanese prison.31)  A for-
mer boxer, Hakamada Iwao, has also been on death row for 44 years as of 2012.  He 
is currently 76 years old and the second longest-serving inmate in Japan since he 
was sentenced to death in 1968 for murder of a family of four in 1966.32)
Of course, guarantees to respect the human rights of criminals exist in Japan. 
The Japanese police take pains to demonstrate their non-violent character in the 
public.  In sharp contrast to some countries where criminals are shot in self-defense 
when necessary, the Japanese police are strikingly non-violent.  The Asama-Sanso¯ 
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(Asama lodge) incident of February 1972 demonstrates this non-violent approach.  In 
this incident, ﬁve student radicals of the United Red Army broke into a mountain 
lodge and took the lodge keeper’s wife as hostage.  The police were patient and sur-
rounded the lodge for ten days before managing to break the psychological resolve 
of the terrorists.33)  In the process, two policemen and one television cameraman 
were killed, and 23 policemen were injured.  The police nonetheless stuck to the rule 
not to use pistols in order to avoid bloodshed, even though 1,500 policemen were de-
ployed with ten armored cars, four water cannon trucks, and a wrecking ball 
crane.34)  Although this is an example from nearly 40 years ago, it is still common 
that members of the hijacker’s family–the mother in particular–are called in by 
the police in an attempt to convince the hijacker to surrender.35)  Nonetheless, in 
murder cases where the criminals are unknown, the attention of the police and pros-
ecutors seems to center on ﬁnding suspects and generating confessions as quickly as 
possible.
As one recent study concludes: “If public prosecutors recommend the death sen-
tence in court, which they do increasingly frequently […], it has recently become 
more certain that this will be the sentence of the court.”36)  Prosecutors are not re-
quired to tape or video-record interrogations, unlike the practice in countries such 
as the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and many states of the United States. 
In the United Kingdom, for example, it became mandatory to video-record in 1986, 
in Alaska in 1985, and Minnesota in 1994.37)  The most recent case that highlighted 
the necessity for a visual record of the interrogation is the Fukawa Case.38)  The Fu-
kawa Case is a murder-robbery incident that took place in Ibaraki Prefecture on Au-
gust 30, 1967.  Sakurai Sho¯ji and Sugiyama Takao, 20 and 21 at the time of the 
crime, respectively, were suspected in the murder of a 62-year-old carpenter.  After a 
series of long interrogation session, they confessed to the crime, even though their 
ﬁngerprints or hair were not found at the murder scene.39)  They were sentenced to 
life imprisonment on July 3, 1978.  Although released on parole in November 1996, 
they repeatedly submitted petitions for retrial.  Their petition was accepted in Sep-
tember 2005 and in June 2011 they were found innocent, some 44 years after the ini-
tial guilty verdict.  Tape recordings of their “confessions” were found to have been 
edited in 13 places, and a new DNA test conﬁrmed their innocence.40)  According to 
a Jiji Press report, interrogators do not necessarily take a full note of what offenders 
say in order to respect their wills: some offenders demand to be interrogated only in 
private with a single investigator so that matters revealed will remain in the interro-
gation room.41)  One interrogator who was interviewed by Jiji Press explained that 
the real motive is usually something private or embarrassing, which they do not 
want to be known to members of their families or to the general public after their re-
lease from the prison.  In other words, if the whole interrogation were to be video-
taped, they may not tell the investigators the real motive of the crime they had com-
mitted.42)  This contradicts the results of research on Japanese criminal practice: 
interrogations are not videotaped since what takes place in the daiyo¯  kangoku is often 
torture designed to generate confessions.  As Johnson argues, “the system is so hos-
tile to outside scrutiny that it remains impossible to see or say what many of the 
problems are.”43)
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Eda Satsuki, who served as the Minister of Justice from January to September 
2011, demanded that, in light of the Fukawa Case, tape and video-recording of inter-
rogations should be mandatory.  However, no immediate change has taken place. 
Despite statements issued by the Parliamentary League to Realize the Visualization 
of Interrogations within the Democratic Party of Japan and resolutions passed in the 
House of Councilors, no progress appears to have been made.
2.3.  Detention Centers
Prison Guards and Chaplains
Next, I will examine the key players in detention centers as the afﬁliated facilities 
of the Ministry of Justice, mainly referring to the work of Kikuta Ko¯ichi44), professor 
of criminology; and Mori Tatsuya45), a journalist.  I will clarify that prosecutors ex-
ert tremendous power in Japanese criminal justice, and have a near monopoly on 
important posts in the Ministry of Justice.
First of all, prosecutors are also responsible for the preparation of documents that 
notify the Minister of Justice on who is to be executed next and when.  Article 472 of 
the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that execution is carried out in the initia-
tive of the head of the Public Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce.  It may seem inappropriate for 
prosecutors to be in charge of this task, especially given the fact that it is prison 
guards in the Correction Bureau that deal with the death row inmates on a daily ba-
sis and are intimately aware of their health and mental condition.  Moreover, the po-
sitions of the Director-General of the Criminal Affairs Bureau and the Correction 
Bureau are regularly ﬁlled by former prosecutors.  In many cases, the latter post is 
given to someone with no practical experience in correction.46)  Since the Director-
General of the Correction Bureau is a prime candidate, within a few years, for pro-
motion to the Chief Public Prosecutor, it is important to ensure that offenders cause 
no trouble during their term.  By contrast, the highest position given to those with 
practical experience in correction is the head of the Regional Correction Headquar-
ters.47)  Since they will be transferred to another prison after several years, naturally 
they place emphasis on avoidance of trouble or accidents during their term.  They 
attempt to discourage offenders from seeking redress or initiating a lawsuit.  Instead, 
they make potential trouble-makers work harder and do not allow them to disclose 
information about prison life.  Indeed, their prime objective is to seek to keep death 
row inmates in good health and good mental condition so execution will be carried out 
smoothly.48)  The Correction Bureau thus does not have an environment that wel-
comes new ideas or opinions from prison guards to improve the current situation.  It 
is considered best to follow what has been the rule for decades.
Lastly, the responsibility of chaplains needs to be taken into account as they 
maintain contact with the inmates even after they are sentenced to death.  The ori-
gin of the chaplain system can be traced back to the Nara and Heian periods (710–
1185) when monks, especially those associated with Higashi Honganji (Temple of the 
Jodo Shinshu¯ Sect in Kyoto), attempted to provide religious instruction to criminals 
on the eve of their execution.49)  A similar system can be found in the late Edo peri-
od prisons, but the present system has its origins in prison reform introduced in the 
Meiji period.50)  Currently, the Ministry of Justice is in charge of this system al-
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though a journalist, Sato¯ Tomoyuki, contends that the chaplain system is in contra-
diction to Article 20 of the Japanese Constitution.51)  The Ministry’s secretive policy 
is also apparent here, as chaplains are not allowed to disclose any information about 
the content of their communication with their inmates or express their own opinions 
on capital punishment system in Japan.52)  Although the chaplain who served Kimu-
ra Shu¯ji, a death row inmate, emerged as a vocal anti-death penalty advocate, most 
prison chaplains have followed the Ministry’s policy of secrecy, fearing that offering 
of a spiritual care service to their current inmates would be disrupted by breaking 
the rule.53)
Approximately 70 percent of chaplains are Buddhists, the remainder being Shinto 
and Christian.  Their purpose is to help inmates generate a feeling of remorse and 
prepare them to be executed in a peaceful state of mind.  However, Menda Sakae, a 
former death row inmate, does not approve of giving religious instruction to death 
row inmates.  He is especially disturbed by the emphasis that Buddhist chaplains 
place on the teaching of causality.54)  He contends that if inmates are encouraged to 
believe that they were already doomed by their previous life, they may resign them-
selves to the inevitable and refrain from ﬁghting against what they know to be false 
charges.55)  The initial purpose of the monks in Higashi Honganji was to help the in-
mates generate feelings of remorse and help return to the society after rehabilitation. 
However, their current purpose appears to be making inmates accept the fact that 
they are on death row with no chance of rehabilitation.  In this regard, the chaplain 
system seems curiously designed to make inmates accept their fate without resis-
tance instead of encouraging atonement and rehabilitation.  As such, the chaplains, 
directly or indirectly, comply with the desire of prosecutors to ensure that execu-
tions take place in a smooth, efﬁcient and uneventful manner.
3.  Conclusion
This paper has examined how ofﬁcial decisions are made regarding capital pun-
ishment in Japan.  My argument is that resistance to growing global opposition to 
the death penalty stems from its institutional context.  Although many reports in 
Japanese and foreign media claim strong public support for the system of capital 
punishment, I argue that capital punishment in Japan revolves around a closed sys-
tem of bureaucratic decision making involving the Ministry of Justice and the Public 
Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce.  Without understanding the complex interplay of particular ac-
tors in particular agencies, it is challenging for activists who oppose the death penal-
ty to urge the Japanese government to comply with international norms.  First of all, 
the Japanese government has so far refused to deal with capital punishment as a hu-
man rights issue.  Furthermore, since the capital punishment system has been the 
province of a narrow elite in several governmental agencies, broad appeal to the 
“Japanese government” has proven ineffective.  Whilst it may be critical for Japan’s 
international standing, as one of the two remaining industrialized democracies in 
the world today (the other being the United States) to retain the death penalty, it is 
also necessary for opponents of capital punishment to acknowledge the tightly-knit 
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